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Abstract (126 words) 
Following the seminal work of late nineteenth century economist Etienne Laspeyres 
we analyse the incidence of the Prussian milling and slaughter tax shortly before its 
repeal in 1875.  A comparison of flour prices in cities which levied this tax with cities 
that did not reveals unusually strong tax overshifting.  Modern theories explain 
overshifting of a specific tax with quality improvements or imperfect competition.  
In pursuing these ideas we find that it was rather large surplus costs induced by tax 
collection and monitoring that caused unusually large excess burdens.  The reason 
why the tax remained nevertheless basically unchanged for more than half a century 
is that the urban bourgeoisie successfully prevented its repeal, as the alternative 
would have been the introduction of municipal direct taxes (rent-seeking behaviour). 
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I. Introduction 
In November 1863, Ferdinand Lassalle, one of the founding fathers of the German Socialist 
Party, gave a public speech in which he criticized the Prussian tax system for its regressive 
distributional effects.  Police arrested him right on the spot and he was charged of high treason.  
The public prosecutor justified his action with Lassalle's arguments on the incidence of indirect 
taxes which the prosecutor regarded as false and which he interpreted as sedition. 
What did Lassalle say?  Indirect taxes, he argued, lay especially heavy on the common people 
because the tax burden was fully shifted from the producers, who had to pay them formally, to 
their customers.  As the Saxonian chief statistician Ernst Engel had showed a couple of years 
earlier, the propensity to consume was negatively correlated with income, so that the impact of 
indirect taxes, and above all the notorious Prussian milling and slaughter tax, was regressive.  
Most contemporary economists, though critical of Lassalle's political aims, agreed with his 
analysis, so that the case against Lassalle had to be abandoned.  Today it is still commonly 
assumed that the burden of indirect taxes is shifted—this is precisely one of the reasons why they 
are called "indirect". 
Despite its obvious importance for the assessment of tax and redistribution policies, the 
analysis of the economic burden of taxation is still an intricate issue in modern economics.  On 
the theoretical side, there is a vast and very sophisticated literature that builds on Arnold 
Harberger's general equilibrium approach to incidence analysis.1  Empirical economists, however, 
have found many obstacles to correctly measure the tax burden and mostly stick to the partial 
analysis approach which is still quite difficult to perform.2  Economic historians have only very 
rarely and remotely touched the issue.3  In 1978, a short debate evolved between Peter Mathias 
and Patrick O'Brien on the one hand and Donald McCloskey on the other.  The former analysed 
the impact of taxation on economic growth in Britain and France and acted on the usual 
assumption that the burden of indirect taxes was fully shifted whereas that of direct taxes was 
not.  This provoked McCloskey's comment who argued that the incidence should be measured 
rather than assumed.  Mathias and O'Brien responded that there were no data to elaborate on this 
                                                          
1  Arnold C. Harberger (1962), "The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax", Journal of Political Economy, 70, pp. 
215-240.  I would like to thank Jochen Streb for many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
2  See B.K. Atrostic and James R. Nunns (1990), "Measuring Tax Burden: A Historical Perspective", in Ernest 
R. Berndt and Jack E. Triplett (eds.), Fifty Years of Economic Measurement: The Jubilee of the Conference on Research in 
Income and Wealth, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 343-408; John Creedy (1998), Measuring Welfare 
Changes and Tax Burdens, Cheltenham: Elgar, chs. 7, 8 and 11; Don Fullerton and Gilbert E. Metcalf (2002), "Tax 
incidence", in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, vol. IV, Amsterdam et 
al.: Elsevier, pp. 1787-1872, here pp. 1817-1823. 
3  We could not find a single study published in English or German that analyses tax incidence in a historical 
perspective.  Jonathan B. Pritchett (1989), "The Burden of Negro Schooling: Tax Incidence and Racial 
 3
issue and that the "burden of proof" lay on McCloskey.4  Though Rolf Dumke and Eckart 
Schremmer soon joined McCloskey in pleaing for a historical analysis of tax incidence, the issue 
has not been taken up by economic historians so far.5  
For a start, the incidence of the Prussian milling and slaughter tax is worth a closer look.  As 
this tax was much disputed in Prussia, there is a comparably large literature on it.  Moreover, it 
had a certain feature that is conducive to empirical analysis: it was levied just in a part of the 
Prussian cities, so that the other part may serve as a natural control group.   
The milling and slaughter tax was introduced with the tax reform of 1820 when the Prussian 
state levied the so-called class tax (graduated tax) on taxpayers in the countryside and those in 
most small cities.  In most large cities the milling and slaughter tax, a specific (or excise, i.e., not 
ad valorem) tax, was levied instead.  While both taxes were state taxes, the cities were granted the 
right to add municipal surtaxes.   
A decade after the Lassalle affair, the tax was repealed.  Having lost its political 
explosiveness, it found the interest of the freshly tenured German economist Etienne Laspeyres, 
descendant of a Huguenot family and today well-known to economists for his price index 
formula.  In 1877 and 1901, he published two articles in which he analysed the incidence of the 
Prussian milling and slaughter tax. Laspeyres was not so much interested in the tax itself but saw 
it as a useful example to analyze the incidence of tariffs on foodstuffs, an issue intensely debated 
among German economists and politicians at the time (Germany introduced protectionist tariffs 
in 1879).  The fact that the milling and slaughter tax had been levied only in a part of the Prussian 
cities allowed him to compare the prices of flour and meat in cities with the tax and in cities 
without (i.e., in which the class tax was levied instead).  His empirical results seemed paradoxical.  
In line with the prevailing economic thinking of the time he had expected that the burden of the 
tax would be shifted fully or nearly fully from the producers to the consumers, that is around 100 
per cent or below.  Yet, whereas he found that this was indeed the case for the slaughter tax, the 
shifting of the milling tax was around 120 per cent in the case of wheat flour and around 200 per 
cent in the case of rye flour.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Redistribution in Postbellum North Carolina", Journal of Economic History, 39, pp. 966-973, merely assumes a value 
for the incidence, like Mathias and O'Brien (see next footnote). 
4  Peter Mathias and Patrick O'Brien (1976), "Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1810. A Comparison of the 
Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments", Journal of European Economic 
History, 5, pp. 601-650; idem (1978), "The Incidence of Taxation and the Burden of Proof", ibid., 7, pp. 211-213; 
Donald McCloskey (1978), "A Mismeasurement of the Incidence of Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1810", 
ibid., 7, pp. 209f. 
5  See Rolf H. Dumke (1985), "Zum Problem der Nicht-Neutralität der Steuersysteme im Industrialisierungs-
prozeß", in Hubert Kiesewetter and Rainer Fremdling (eds.), Staat, Region und Industrialisierung, Ostfildern: Scripta 
Mercaturae, pp. 67-71, here p. 67; Eckart Schremmer (1989), "Taxation and Public Finance: Britain, France, and 
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In his 1877 article, Laspeyres tried to explain why the prices of flour were much higher than 
one would expect.  His economic arguments, however, were not convincing, and in the 1901 
article he restrained himself from any economic explanation.  In a way, the analysis he performed 
in the second article was what would be called a few decades later 'measurement without theory'.6  
His German colleagues mainly ignored his results or used them as an argument to show that it 
was anyway useless trying to determine tax incidence empirically.  Although Laspeyres' analysis is 
probably the earliest and certainly the most detailed early attempt to specify the incidence of a tax 
empirically, this piece of his oeuvre has fallen into oblivion.7   
After World War II, discussions on the distributional effects of taxation raised interest in the 
incidence issue.  An increasing number of empirical studies found that certain specific taxes were 
shifted by more than 100 per cent.  Soon, the phenomenon was named overshifting.  We will 
discuss recent theoretical contributions to explain tax overshifting in the next section.  In the 
third section, we return to the Prussian milling and slaughter tax and check whether we can 
reproduce Laspeyres' empirical findings.  This will be the case and so we analyse in the fourth 
section whether modern approaches are able to explain Laspeyres' paradox.  Although it will turn 
out that they are not, in pursuing these ideas we will find evidence that enables us to argue that 
the observed overshifting in the flour market was a result of extraordinary high tax collection and 
monitoring costs that caused surplus costs for producers.  In the concluding section we will 
discuss why Prussia sticked for over half a century to a tax that weighed unusually heavy on 
producers, consumers and even the state.   
II. Tax Overshifting in Theory 
It was only after World War II when economists took an interest in empirically analyzing tax 
incidence again.  Occasionally, these analyses produced findings similar to those of Laspeyres' 
three quarters of a century before.  Among them was, for example, William Niskanen who 
analysed the demand of alcoholic beverages.8 
These results did not seem compatible with the theory at the time.  In general, the 
opportunity to shift the burden of a producer tax to the consumer depends on the elasticities of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Germany", in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VIII, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
315-494, here p. 423. 
6  Tjalling C. Koopmans (1947), "Measurement without Theory", Review of Economic Statistics, 29, pp. 161-172. 
7  Even Edwin Seligman, who was strongly influenced by German public economists, did not discuss Laspeyres' 
articles on tax incidence, although he was aware of the (in Germany hardly ever quoted) 1877 article; Edwin 
Seligman (1910), The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, 3rd edn., New York: Columbia University Press, p. 372.  In 
the second edition of 1899, there is no reference made to this part of Laspeyres' work, see p. 300. 
8  William A. Niskanen (1963), The Demand for Alcoholic Beverages, Ph.D. diss. Chicago, pp. 54f.  See for an overview 
of early studies that found overshifting: James M. Poterba (1996), "Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and 
Local Sales Taxes", National Tax Journal, 49, pp. 165-176. 
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demand and supply.  In a partial analytic framework with a specific production tax the share of 
the tax burden borne by the consumers is 
(1)   dp / dt = ε / (ε - η) ,  
where p denotes the price, t the tax rate, ε the price elasticity of supply and η the price elasticity 
of demand (usually, η≤0).  Under the assumptions of a downward sloping demand curve, 
competitive markets and an upward sloping supply curve, the producers can shift only a part of 
the tax burden to the consumers.  If demand is totally inelastic or, following Ricardo, the supply 
curve is flat, the producers can pass the whole burden on to the consumers.  In this framework, 
the price without tax, p*, rises to p(t) after the tax is levied, and the following inequalities must 
hold: 
(2) 0 ≤ ∆p(t) = p(t) - p* ≤ t   ↔   0 ≤ ∆p(t)/t ≤ 1. 
Hence, under the usual assumptions the shifting cannot exceed 100 per cent of the tax 
amount, and there is no room for overshifting in the partial analytic framework.9   
The first theoretical explanation for overshifting was formulated by Yoram Barzel in 1976.  
He showed that levying a specific tax may lead to an increase of the taxed product's quality.10  
The intuition is that if a producer of, e.g., cigarettes has to pay a tax of 10 cents per cigarette 
regardless of its value, he will have an incentive to improve the quality of the tobacco or to 
produce longer cigarettes so that he can dilute the tax burden.  Due to the better quality of his 
product, he may be able to increase the price by more than 10 cents.  Barzel's explanation is 
regarded as the first explanation for overshifting.  In our view, however, this is not quite the case 
as Barzel looked at two different products:  one before taxation, and an improved one afterwards.  
Hence the ceteris paribus condition is violated.  As we will see in the empirical part, however, 
Barzel's idea gives valuable insight in how nineteenth century producers reacted on a specific tax. 
Further and more convincing explanations came up in the 1980s with the boom of the 
industrial organization literature that allowed for imperfect competition.  In an unpublished but 
seminal and often quoted paper, Jesús Seade showed that in the case of oligopolistic competition 
a specific tax may lead to overshifting.  The intuition behind his argument and others that 
followed soon is as follows.  The imposition of the tax will typically increase costs and thus the 
price which leads to a reduction of demand and thus the equilibrium number of firms.  This 
reduction leads to an increase of market power (i.e., the opportunity to sell above marginal costs) 
                                                          
9  Timothy J. Besley and Harvey S. Rosen (1999), "Sales Tax and Prices: An Empirical Analysis", National Tax 
Journal, 52, pp. 157-178.  Of course, the tax may also be shifted backwards to producers of input goods.  The 
analysis is symmetric. 
10  Yoram Barzel (1976), "An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation", Journal of Political Economy, 84, pp. 
1177-1197. 
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for the remaining firms who will increase prices.  If the price elasticity of demand is sufficiently 
inelastic, this price increase will exceed the tax amount, and overshifting will occur.11  Empirical 
work on the US retail trade that makes use of precisely the same feature as found by Laspeyres, 
that is of the fact that different US cities levy different local sales tax rates, does indeed find 
overshifting, especially for non-durable consumer goods.12  This strand of the literature also 
discovered that it has an eminent ancestor.  As early as in 1838, it was Augustin Cournot who, 
discussing the effect of a specific tax on a monopoly product, had deduced formally that in this 
case the gross price of the product may increase by more than the tax amount.13  
Another variation of this argument relies on a different set of assumptions.  Timothy Besley 
has shown that in markets that are characterized by zero profits, positive fixed costs and free 
entry the imposition of a specific tax increases the unit costs of production.  As a consequence, 
the gross price p(t) is larger than the sum of the price before the imposition of the tax p* and the 
tax amount t, i.e. we find tax overshifting.14  We will come back to this argument in the 
discussion of Figure 3 below. 
III. The Incidence of the Prussian Milling and Slaughter tax 
In this section and the following, we address two questions.  First, if we control for other 
factors that might affect Prussian flour and meat prices, are we able to reproduce Laspeyres' 
findings?  Second, if so, are the approaches in the modern literature sufficient to explain what 
Laspeyres found paradoxical? 
The Prussian milling and slaughter tax was introduced in 1820.  The criteria on which the 
central government in Berlin decided whether a city should levy the milling and slaughter tax or 
the class tax were city size and, in respect to guarding the tax line, topographical characteristics.  
As a result the tax was levied only in part of the Prussian cities.  In the other, often (but not 
always) small cities and rural areas, the Prussian state levied the class tax, which was a hybrid of a 
                                                          
11  Jesús Seade (1985), "Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation: Equilibrium Responses of Markets in 
Oligopoly" (University of Warwick, Discussion Paper no. 260), Warwick. See also Nicholas H. Stern (1987), "The 
Effects of Taxation, Price Control and Government Contracts in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition", 
Journal of Public Economics, 32, pp. 133-158, here pp. 140f., 154; Sofia Delipalla and Michael Keen (1992), "The 
Comparison Between Ad Valorem and Specific Taxation Under Imperfect Competition", Journal of Public 
Economics, 49, pp. 351-368.  For a different formulation of Seade's argument, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), 
pp. 1825f. 
12 Besley and Rosen (1999). 
13 Augustin Cournot (1838), Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses, Paris: Hachette, p. 77.  This 
had already been assumed by Adam Smith, but without theoretical reasoning; Adam Smith (1776), An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London: Strahan & Cadell, vol. II, pp. 484, 487.  Cf. Delipalla and 
Keen (1992), p. 356. 
14  Timothy J. Besley (1989), "Commodity Taxation and Imperfect Competition. A Note on the Effects of Entry", 
Journal of Public Economics, 40, pp. 359-367. 
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poll tax and a primitive income tax and is usually translated as 'graduated tax'.15  The milling and 
slaughter tax was not introduced in the new northwest German territories Prussia acquired in 
1866 (except Frankfurt on Main, where it was introduced to replace the municipal excise). 
Figure 1: Who Paid the Class Tax and Who the Milling and Slaughter Tax in 1873?  
    Rural residents         Urban residents 
 
Sources: Ludwig Herrfurth (1878), "Beiträge zur Statistik der Gemeindeabgaben in Preussen. Unter Benutzung 
amtlicher Quellen bearbeitet", Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus, 18, pp. 1-60, here p. 26; 
Prussian cities sorted according to population in 1875 (> 30,000), see Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1 
(1880). Ed. by Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, p. 7.  
 
Both taxes, but especially the milling and slaughter tax, faced strong criticism.  When 
contemporary economists discussed tax reforms in Prussia, many criticized the milling and 
slaughter tax for three reasons.  First, it was obviously an unsystematic feature of the tax system 
to have the rural residents and part of the urban residents pay the (direct) class tax and the other 
part of the urban residents pay the (indirect) milling and slaughter tax.  This divided the tax 
system between the countryside and most cities.  Second, the milling and slaughter tax required a 
tax line that had to be drawn around the affected cities.  Inside this line, which was guarded and 
thus caused costs, milling grain and slaughtering cattle was subject to permission and monitoring 
of the local tax authorities.  Tax line and supervision hampered trade.  An unwelcome though not 
surprising side-effect was smuggling, mainly of flour.  Third, economists and practicians widely 
assumed that at least a part of the tax burden was shifted to the consumers via an increase of 
flour prices and thus of bread prices.  After the publication of what became known as Engel's 
Law in 1857, the regressive consequences were obvious.16  In addition, even in cities of 
                                                          
15  Schremmer (1989), p. 424. 
16  Ernst Engel (1857), "Die vorherrschenden Gewerbezweige in den Gerichtsämtern mit Beziehung auf die 
Productions- und Consumtionsverhältnisse des Königreichs Sachsen", Zeitschrift des sächsischen Statistischen Bureaus, 
3, pp. 129-182, here pp. 169-172. 
        Class tax 
Hanover, Barmen, Altona, Elber-
feld, Krefeld, Dortmund, Essen, 
Kassel, Erfurt, Wiesbaden, Duis-
burg, Kiel, Munster, Mönchen-
gladbach ... 
either                 or
Milling and slaughter tax 
Berlin, Breslau, Cologne, Königsberg, 
Frankfurt on Main, Danzig, Magdeburg, 
Stettin, Dusseldorf, Aix-la-Chapelle, 
Posen, Halle, Frankfurt on Oder, Görlitz, 
Potsdam, Elbing, Liegnitz, Bromberg ... 
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comparable size and wealth the milling and slaughter tax load per capita was about twice as high 
as the class tax load per capita.17  These deficiencies evoked criticism at a time when the social 
question gained increasing attention.   
As a consequence, the history of the milling and slaughter tax is full of attempts to reform or 
to repeal it.  The protests peaked in the years of famine 1846-7 and in the 1860s, when the social 
question came on the political agenda—see the detention of Lassalle.  Only when the Prussian 
state finances were in unusual good shape, partly thanks to the French war indemnity, was the tax 
repealed in 1873 (effective January 1, 1875). 
Laspeyres devoted two articles to the subject.  The first was published in 1877 in an Austrian 
statistical journal and was based on 13,440 monthly prices.  For the second he had generations of 
students compute price averages from millions of monthly observations supplied by the Prussian 
Statistical Bureau.  Finally, he published his second article 1901 in the renowned Finanz-Archiv.18 
In neither article did Laspeyres perform a cross-section analysis by directly comparing the 
prices of cities that levied the milling and slaughter tax (henceforth "tax cities") with those that 
levied the class tax (henceforth "non-tax cities").  Instead he compared the difference of the price 
changes in the two groups of cities shortly before and after the repeal.  The main difference 
between the two articles was that in the latter Laspeyres increased the number of observed 
products and cities.   
His basic findings were nevertheless the same: full shifting or weak undershifting of the 
slaughter tax in the meat markets, weak overshifting of the milling tax in the wheat flour market 
and strong overshifting in the rye flour market.  After the repeal of the tax, the price differences 
vanished immediately.  We reproduce his main results in Table 1 (next page). 
As Laspeyres used a larger sample and a slightly refined analysis in his 1901 article, we refer 
to the right part of Table 1 (cols. v to viii).  Column (v) shows the absolute amount of the tax in 
Pfennig per kilogram, and column (vi) compares this to the average price in the tax cities.   As we 
can see, wheat flour was taxed strongest relative to its value.  In column (vii), Laspeyres compares 
the difference of the price changes between non-tax cities and tax cities in 1874 and 1875, when 
the tax became ineffective.  In tax cities the changes of flour and meat prices were much stronger 
than in non-tax cities.  The pork prices, e.g., were in line with the predictions of the theory as the 
average price decrease between 1874 and 1875 was 8.3 Pfennig larger in tax cities than in non-tax 
                                                          
17  Deutsche Gemeinde-Zeitung, 1 (1862), pp. 561, 573. 
18  Etienne Laspeyres (1877), "Statistische Untersuchungen über den Einfluss einer Steueraufhebung auf die Preise 
der bisher besteuerten Producte", Statistische Monatschrift, 3, pp. 497-514, 545-555; idem (1901), "Statist. Untersu-
chungen zur Frage der Steuerüberwälzung, geführt an der Geschichte der preussischen Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer. 
Nach gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen", Finanz-Archiv, 18, pp. 46-282. 
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cities (prices generally fell in this period).  This difference was slightly below the amount of the 
tax (9.0 Pfennig), which thus had been nearly fully shifted in 1874, more precisely by 92 per cent 
(col. viii = col. vii / col. v).  The shifting of the tax on wheat flour was a bit outside the expected 
range (120 per cent > max [0.0; 1.0]) and could possibly be attributed to measurement error, but 
that of rye flour was disturbing.  How could a tax of 1.67 Pfennig per kilogram of rye flour have 
caused a price difference of 3.1 Pfennig between tax cities and non-tax cities?  Laspeyres 
performed an impressive series of sensitivity analyses in order to detect pseudo-correlations, but 
to no effect.   
Table 1: Differences in Price Fluctuations in Prussian Cities After the Repeal of the Milling and 
Slaughter tax, 1874-75 
Article  1877 (20 cities) 1901 (136 cities) 
Variable 
Year 
Dimension 
t 
1874 
[Pf/kg] 
(i) 
t / p 
 1874 
[per cent] 
(ii) 
∆ p 
1874→75
[Pf/kg] 
(iii) 
- ∆ p / t
 
[per cent]
(iv) 
t 
1874 
[Pf/kg] 
(v) 
t / p 
 1874 
[per cent] 
(vi) 
∆ p 
1874→75 
[Pf/kg] 
(vii) 
- ∆ p / t
 
[per cent]
(viii) 
Rye flour   1.38    3.9   -3.00 217 1.67   4.6  -3.10 186 
Wheat flour   5.48  11.3   -6.90 126 6.67 12.7  -8.00 120 
Pork   10.28    7.7 -10.28 100 9.00   6.8  -8.30  92 
Beef  10.28    9.3  -9.90   96 9.00   7.4  -7.30   81 
Potatoes   0.00 -   n/a - 0.00 -  -0.30 - 
Butter   0.00 -   n/a - 0.00 - +0.10 - 
Notes: kg – kilogram; n/a – not available; p – price in tax cities; ∆p – difference of the price changes in non-tax cities 
vs. tax cities; Pf = Pfennig (100 Pfennig = 1 Mark); t – tax amount.  As we recalculated Laspeyres' averages some 
figures deviate very slightly from his. 
Sources: Etienne Laspeyres (1877), "Statistische Untersuchungen über den Einfluss einer Steueraufhebung auf die 
Preise der bisher besteuerten Producte", Statistische Monatschrift, 3, pp. 497-514, 545-555, here pp. 508-512, 546-
550; idem (1901), "Statist. Untersuchungen zur Frage der Steuerüberwälzung, geführt an der Geschichte der 
preussischen Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer. Nach gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen", Finanz-Archiv, 18, pp. 46-
282, here pp. 232, 280.  
 
Now, are we able to reproduce Laspeyres' results?  We rely on the same data source for 
prices as he did.  The Prussian Statistical Office published monthly prices of food and other 
necessaries since 1865 which, in 1873, covered 157 cities.  Here we use the prices from July 1873 
to June 1874 (and in an auxiliary calculation from July 1875 to June 1876).  This allows a 
comparison with Laspeyres' figures which are from January 1874 to December 1875 and avoids 
noise in the data due to anticipatory effects (hardly anybody would have postponed meat 
consumption in July 1874 for six months).  We also collected prices for rye and wheat, the main 
inputs for the flour production.  Local cattle prices, however, were not recorded by the statistical 
office or other institutions.  Table 2 (next page) summarizes the main descriptive characteristics 
of  the price and tax data. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Price and Tax Data, July 1873 to June 1874 (Pfennig per 
kilogram) 
 Non-tax cities Tax cities 
 Prices  Prices Taxes  
  mean 
(i) 
  SD 
(ii) 
cities 
(iii) 
 mean 
(iv) 
  SD 
(v) 
mean 
(vi) 
cities 
(vii) 
Rye flour   35.06   4.56  91a   38.23   4.80 1.94 63 
Rye    21.32   1.25 88   20.56   1.42 - 59 
Wheat flour   47.88   5.37  93a   55.42   5.92 6.90 63 
Wheat    27.20   1.39 85   26.17   1.62 - 58 
Pork  132.96 13.28 93 133.68 12.74 8.95 63 
Beef 134.56 20.78 94 131.26 17.44 8.95 63 
Notes:  SD – standard deviation.  Wheat, rye, rye flour and pork price data are not available for all of the 157 cities. 
a One outlier excluded.  
Sources: Zeitschrift des königlich statistischen preußischen Bureaus, 13 (1873). Ed. by Königliches Statistisches Bureau, Berlin: 
Königliches Statistisches Bureau, pp. 181-256; ibid., 14 (1874), pp. 45-80, 401-442 (prices); Deutsche Gemeinde-
Zeitung, 6 (1867), p. 437; Emil Blenck (1871), "Beiträge zur preussischen Staats- und Communal-
Finanzstatistik", Zeitschrift des königlich preußischen statistischen Bureaus, 11, pp. 145-162, here pp. 161f. (taxes). 
 
If we compare the average tax amount (col. vi) with the difference of the price means 
between tax cities and non-tax cities (col. iv – col. i) we can reproduce what Laspeyres found 
paradoxical, i.e. strong overshifting of the tax in the rye flour market, weak overshifting for wheat 
flour and undershifting for meat (e.g., rye flour: 38.23 – 35.06 = 3.17 > 1.94, etc.).   
One can nevertheless think of factors other than the tax that could explain the price 
differences.  As the tax was more likely to be levied in large towns with (possibly) higher price 
levels one could speculate that Laspeyres just measured a spurious correlation.  Given the large 
differences between the advanced western parts and the backward East of Prussia, one could also 
think of regional idiosyncrasies that affected the output prices of flour and meat, such as wages 
and other input prices.  E.g., the high mean of the beef prices in non-tax cities is driven by two 
Prussian cities adjacent to (non-Prussian) Hamburg, then the richest German city on per capita 
basis.  Hence, when recalculating Laspeyres' results it may be sensible to control for these factors 
simultaneously. 
The most important independent variable is the tax.  While Laspeyres' approach was like 
using a dummy variable for the tax, we use actual tax rates in our regressions (except in Tables 6a 
and 6b).  The actual tax rates include the state tax, which was uniform all over Prussia, and the 
individual municipal surtax which was in the range of 0 to 50 per cent of the state tax.19  For the 
                                                          
19  Emil Blenck (1871), "Beiträge zur preussischen Staats- und Communal-Finanzstatistik", Zeitschrift des königlich 
preußischen statistischen Bureaus, 11, pp. 145-162, here p. 161. – This explains why our tax amounts in Table 2, 
col. vi, deviate slightly from Laspeyres' in Table 1, col.  v. 
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production costs of rye flour and wheat flour we include grain prices and wages.  Local cattle 
prices are not available. 
Nationwide wage data are difficult to find for pre-1900 Germany.  The earliest source for 
Prussia are wages paid in the Prussian forest domains.20  These were, however, only recorded in 
retrospect by seemingly reluctant rangers and display an unusually large variance.  Moreover, they 
are not available for many important industrial towns in the Western provinces.  We rely on 
another source here which, to our knowledge, has been used very rarely so far.  In 1883, 
Germany decreed a law that entitled workers to receive sickness benefits the amount of which 
was based on local minimum wages.  Hence, all over Germany local commissions were charged 
with determining the minimum wage in their regions.  Their work added up to a list of local 
minimum wages for several thousand cities, villages and even estates which was published by an 
official source since 1892.21  We were able to find a private source that assembled and published 
the first official data of the list, presumably for 1885 (or 1884).22  This date is ten years after the 
repeal of the milling and slaughter tax and thus will by and large still reflect the regional wage 
differences of 1873-74 and helps avoiding endogeneity.  Table 3 (next page) summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of the population and wage data. 
Taken together, we have the following data for the right hand side of the regression 
equations: the tax (including local surtaxes), grain prices, the wage level (of 1885) and city 
population (from the population census of 1871).     
Before we proceed we have to check a possible problem, that is whether not only the flour 
prices, but the grain prices as well were affected by the tax, or, in other words, whether the tax 
was shifted backwards to the input producers, a case not analysed by Laspeyres.  In Table 4 (next 
page) we show the results of regressions of rye and wheat prices against the tax and against either 
wages (model I) or provincial dummies (model II).  
                                                          
20  Udo Eggert (1883), "Die Bewegung der Holzpreise und Tagelohn-Sätze in den preussischen Staatsforsten von 
1800 bis 1870", Zeitschrift des königlich statistischen preußischen Bureaus, 23 (1883), pp. 1-44. 
21  Central-Blatt für das Deutsche Reich (1892), pp. 717-783, and subsequent issues (approximately every five years). 
22  J. Schmitz (1888), Uebersicht der für die sämmtlichen deutschen Bundesstaaten im Gemässheit des § 8 des Reichsgesetzes 
betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter vom 15. Juni 1883 festgestellen ortsüblichen Tagelöhne gewöhnlicher Tagearbeiter, 
2nd ed., Berlin et al.: Heuser. 
 12
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of City Population and Minimum Wage Data 
 Non-tax cities Tax cities 
   population 1871 wage 1885  population 1871 wage 1885
Province no. mean  median mean no. mean median mean 
Prussia  4 10,770   9,793 1.26  8 39,017 19,630 1.46 
Pomerania  3 11,440   9,050 1.30  7 24,925 16,279 1.49 
Posen  0 - - -  5 23,044 10,672 1.35 
Silesia 11 11,627 10,687 1.13 14 30,110 15,347 1.18 
Brandenburg  7 10,079   9,675 1.29 12 87,893 18,739 1.58 
Saxony 17 21,108 13,436 1.64  7 19,198 15,120 1.65 
Schleswig  9 21,059 11,521 2.17  0 - - - 
Hanover 11 22,210 15,852 1.79  0 - - - 
Hesse  6 21,528 14,882 1.94  1 91,040 91,040 2.40 
Westphalia 11 19,436 16,593 1.88  0 - - - 
Rhine Province 16 26,878 14,469 2.05  8 47,065 27,389 2.00 
Prussia 95 19,384 12,937 1.71 62 43,226 17,139 1.52 
Sources: Jahrbuch für die amtliche Statistik des Preußischen Staats, 4 (1876). Ed. by Königlich Statistisches Bureau, Berlin: 
Decker, pp. 61-70 (population); J. Schmitz (1888), Uebersicht der für die sämmtlichen deutschen Bundesstaaten im 
Gemässheit des § 8 des Reichsgesetzes betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter vom 15. Juni 1883 festgestellen ortsüblichen 
Tagelöhne gewöhnlicher Tagearbeiter, 2nd ed., Berlin et al.: Heuser (wages). 
 
Table 4: Impact Factors on Wheat and Rye Prices in Prussian Cities, 1873-74 
  Rye Wheat 
 I II I II 
Tax  
[Pf/kg] 
   -0.30* 
  [0.13] 
  -0.05 
   [0.12] 
  -0.10* 
 (0.04) 
-0.01 
 [0.03] 
Wages (log)  
[Marks/day] 
+0.80   
  [0.46] 
-    +2.28*** 
 (0.49) 
- 
Provincial dummies 
significant at 5%-level 
- 6 - 8 
Constant 
 
      17.17*** 
   [2.37] 
      21.99*** 
   [0.33] 
     15.51*** 
  (2.55) 
     28.65*** 
  [0.29] 
Average price [Pf/kg] 21.01 21.01 26.79 26.79 
Observations (cities) 148 148 144 144 
Adj. R2   0.06  0.47   0.20   0.44 
Prob(F)   0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00 
Notes: OLS.  Model II contains 10 dummies for 11 Prussian provinces.  Standard errors in parentheses [White-
corrected if in brackets].  *, **, *** significant at 5, 1, 0.1 per cent level, respectively.  Testing for population (in 
logs) or including wages in model II does not have mentionable impact on the results. 
Sources:  See text. 
 
Model I, which includes wages, suggests that rye and wheat prices were significantly lower in 
tax cities, 30 and 10 per cent, respectively.  The difference seems to make sense, as a larger share 
of the wheat production was traded internationally.  Turning to model II, which tries to capture 
Table 5: Impact Factors on Flour and Meat Prices in Prussian Cities, 1873-74 
Product Rye flour Wheat flour Pork Beef 
Model I        II III I II III I+II I+II
Tax [Pf/kg]        1.90*** 
 [0.43] 
      1.84***
[0.51] 
      1.93***
[0.48] 
      1.09***
[0.11] 
      1.13***
[0.11] 
      1.15***
[0.12] 
  0.54* 
(0.22) 
    0.82** 
[0.29] 
Price for rye or wheat [Pf/kg]     0.80** 
 [0.28] 
0.64 
[0.46] 
  0.91* 
[0.46] 
   0.99* 
 [0.41] 
0.65 
[0.38] 
    1.64** 
[0.63] 
-  
        
        
-
Wages (log)  
[Marks/day] 
 2.61 
 [1.67] 
- 2.51 
[1.65] 
1.81 
[1.76] 
-  0.33 
 [2.01] 
  12.81* 
  (5.54) 
  20.55* 
[7.95] 
Provincial dummies 
significant at 5%-level 
- 5 - - 1 - 9 4
Average price [Pf/kg] 36.22 36.22 36.22 50.62 50.62 50.62 133.25 133.23
Observations (cities) 145        145 145 142 142 142 156 157
Adj. R2   0.15   0.25 0.15   0.32   0.46 0.30 0.40 0.45 
Prob(F)   0.00   0.00 0.00   0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Models I and II OLS, model III 2SLS.  Constant not reported.  Model II contains 10 dummies for 11 Prussian provinces.  Model III uses the tax, wages and ten regional 
dummies as instruments.  Standard errors in parentheses [White-corrected if in brackets].  *, **, *** significant at 5, 1, 0.1 per cent confidence level, respectively.  Testing for 
population (in logs) or dropping the wage variable in the flour regressions does not have mentionable impact on the results. 
Sources: Zeitschrift des königlich statistischen preußischen Bureaus, 13 (1873). Ed. by Königliches Statistisches Bureau, Berlin: Königliches Statistisches Bureau, pp. 181-256; ibid., 14 (1874), 
pp. 45-80, 401-442 (prices); Deutsche Gemeinde-Zeitung, 6 (1867), p. 437; Emil Blenck (1871), "Beiträge zur preussischen Staats- und Communal-Finanzstatistik", Zeitschrift des königlich 
preußischen statistischen Bureaus, 11, pp. 145-162, here pp. 161f. (taxes); J. Schmitz (1888), Uebersicht der für die sämmtlichen deutschen Bundesstaaten im Gemässheit des § 8 des Reichsgesetzes 
betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter vom 15. Juni 1883 festgestellten ortsüblichen Tagelöhne gewöhnlicher Tagearbeiter, 2nd ed., Berlin et al.: Heuser (wages); Jahrbuch für die amtliche 
Statistik des Preußischen Staats, 4 (1876). Ed. by Königlich Statistisches Bureau, Berlin: Decker, pp. 61-70 (population) . 
regional idiosyncrasies by using dummy variables rather than wages, we must conclude that the 
backshifting effect was numerically very low and insignificant.  Since just taking wages is 
presumably not sufficient to control for regional idiosyncrasies and since the explanatory power 
of model II is much higher, one might be tempted to attach more value to this model, which 
clearly rejects backshifting.23 
We nevertheless should keep in mind that backward shifting might play a role.  For this 
reason, we test in our recalculation of the Laspeyres-Paradox a third model for our regressions on 
the flour and meat prices which controls for endogeneity of grain prices (see Table 5 above). 
For the interpretation it is important to keep in mind that the price and tax variables are not 
expressed in logarithms, which allows a straightforward interpretation of the coefficients.24  Our 
focus is on the coefficients of the tax variable which indicate the amount of tax shifting.  For 
example, the coefficient of the first model for rye flour indicates that an increase of the tax by 
one Pfennig increases the price for rye flour by 1.9 Pfennig (or 190 per cent of the tax amount).  
Thus all three models signal strong overshifting in the rye flour market.  For the wheat market, 
the results indicate weak overshifting, whereas the slaughter tax was not fully shifted forwards to 
the consumers—but remember that for lack of cattle price data, we cannot assess in how far the 
slaughter tax was shifted backwards.  As cattle was traded regionally, backshifting appears quite 
plausible.  The coefficients for the production inputs make sense.  An increase of the grain price 
of 1 Pfennig led to a similar increase of the flour price, and higher wages also went along with 
higher flour and meat prices.  Hence, Laspeyres' results can be fully reproduced even if we 
control for more variables than he could, especially the large structural differences between the 
various Prussian provinces. 
IV. What Caused Overshifting? 
How can we explain our findings (and those of Laspeyres)?  The relative differences in 
forward shifting—slaughter tax undershifted, milling tax weakly overshifted in the wheat flour 
market and strongly overshifted in the rye flour market—may be due to different price elasticities 
of demand.  Yet this does not explain the unexpectedly high levels of tax shifting in the flour 
markets. 
Before we turn to the theoretical approaches introduced in section II, we discuss a 
phenomenon often mentioned in the contemporary literature: smuggling.  Smuggling livestock or 
                                                          
23  Skeptical readers should note that any backshifting increases the gap between flour prices with and without the tax 
to be explained. 
24  This estimation strategy has the disadvantage that we run a higher risk of heteroscedasticity.  Thus standard 
errors are corrected by the White procedure, if appropriate. 
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meat into the cities was difficult.  What people did smuggle on sizeable scale was flour.  The 
authorities complained that smuggling flour was a kind of common sport of the urban poor.  An 
interesting feature is that, according to the Prussian finance minister in an aide-memoire for a 
parlamentary hearing, no smuggler would ever smuggle rye flour, all those who were captured 
had the more expensive wheat flour with them.25   This must have put downward pressure on the 
prices of wheat flour, and, to a lesser extent, of rye flour as well, because it was a partial 
substitute.  In respect to explaining the Laspeyres-Paradox, however, this argument works in the 
opposite direction, as we find for flour overshifting, not undershifting.  If any, this may, along 
with the elasticity argument, help to explain the difference in overshifting between wheat flour 
and rye flour.   
It is interesting to note that when the smugglers decided to focus on wheat flour they 
followed precisely the rationale that is behind the quality argument of Barzel.  Being caught with 
a given quantity of contraband would lead to a penalty regardless of its value (within limits).  
Thus the smugglers focused on wheat flour which was, relative to the price, much higher taxed 
than either rye flour or meat (Table 1, col. vi).   
The same reasoning held for the legal trade in livestock and meat.  There is convincing 
anecdotal evidence that the quality of meat was definitely better in tax cities than in non-tax 
cities.26  The reason given by the contemporary literature mirrors exactly Barzel's argument.  As 
the slaughter tax was levied per piece or weight of cattle, there was an incentive to bring high-
quality livestock in the tax cities.  This explanation, however, also works in the wrong direction, 
as an improvement of quality would explain overshifting in the meat market, not, as observed, 
undershifting.  In contrast, there is not a single hint in the contemporary literature that the flour 
consumed in tax cities was of superior (or inferior) quality.27 
What about the second argument of the theoretical literature,  that is imperfect competition?  
It should be clear that any argument that rests on imperfect competition must explain why there 
were barriers to competition in the tax cities but not in the non-tax cities.  In this respect it is 
interesting to note that the milling and slaughter tax law of 1820 stipulated that the establishment 
                                                          
25  Von Düesberg (1847), "Denkschrift betreffend die Aufhebung der Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer, die Beschränkung 
der Klassensteuer und die Erhebung einer Einkommensteuer", in Eduard Bleich (ed.), Der Erste Vereinigte Landtag 
in Berlin 1847, vol. I, Berlin: Reimarus, pp. 40-64, here p. 60. 
26 For references, see Mark Spoerer (2004), Steuerlast, Steuerinzidenz und Steuerwettbewerb. Verteilungswirkungen der 
Besteuerung in Preußen und Württemberg (1815-1913), Berlin: Akademie, p. 156. See also Deutsche Gemeinde-Zeitung, 14 
(1875), p. 100. 
27  According to Napoleon Weinhagen (1872), Gegen die Schlacht- und Mahlsteuer. Ein Memento für die Stadtverordneten von 
Köln, Cologne,  pp. 7-9, the quality of bread in Cologne (which levied the milling tax) was negatively affected by the 
difference of the tax rates on wheat flour and rye flour. 
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of grain mills was subject to government approval.28  Thus one can speculate that the local 
authorities made restrictive use of this rule either deliberately to protect existing businesses or 
unintentionally, perhaps because they constantly underestimated the pace of city growth.   
How can we test imperfect competition?  Profit data are not available, but data on the 
number of businesses and their employees are.  This may give clues on whether there was 
business concentration among the grain mills, bakeries or butcheries in tax cities.29  The only 
business census which falls into the period of the milling and slaughter tax and which has detailed 
information on grain mills, bakeries and butcheries is that of 1849 (139 cities).  The one census 
that is close to our year of investigation, 1873-74, dates from the first of December 1875, that is 
eleven month after the milling and slaughter tax became ineffective.  It is nevertheless plausible 
that the market structure that had developed under the tax regime was still existent eleven 
months after the repeal of the tax.  Thus it might be worthwile to analyse this data set of 54 
Prussian cities as well. 
Table 6a: Impact Factors on Density and Size of Grain Mills, Bakeries and Butcheries in 139 
Prussian Cities, 1849  
 Businesses per 1,000 population Employees per businessa 
 Mills Bakeries  Butcheries Mills Bakeries  Butcheries
Tax (0/1) 0.02 
[0.17] 
-0.66*** 
[0.16] 
-0.70*** 
[0.16] 
0.68 
[0.67] 
0.20* 
[0.09] 
0.20** 
[0.07] 
Population (log) -0.24* 
[0.10] 
-0.56*** 
[0.10] 
-0.37*** 
[0.09] 
0.58** 
[0.21] 
0.43*** 
[0.06] 
0.14*** 
[0.04] 
Provincial dummies 
significant at 5%-level 
3 6 3 0 6 4 
Constant 2.63** 
[0.91] 
9.50*** 
[1.08] 
6.61*** 
[0.93] 
-1.51 
[2.36] 
-2.31*** 
[0.54] 
0.22 
[0.35] 
Average dep. variable 0.98 2.63 2.28 3.21 2.29 1.87 
Observations (cities) 139 138 138 135 138 138 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.58 0.33 0.08 0.52 0.33 
Prob(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Notes: OLS.  The Model contains 6 dummies for the 7 Prussian provinces.  Standard errors in parentheses [White-
corrected if in brackets].   *, **, *** significant on 10, 5, 1, 0.1 per cent level, respectively.  a Owners included. 
Sources: Sources: Tabellen und amtliche Nachrichten über den Preussischen Staat für das Jahr 1849, Berlin: Hayn, vol. I (1851), 
p. 276, vol. IV (1853), pp. 152-162, vol. V (1854), pp. 1-821. 
 
Both tables show that the density and size of grain mills was neither in 1849 nor in 1875 
influenced by the tax.  Bakeries and butcheries, in contrast, were heavily affected by the tax.  For 
1849 the results of Table 6a show clearly that there was concentration both in the bakery and in 
                                                          
28 §7b, see Ernst Engel (1868), "Die Ergebnisse der Classensteuer, der classificirten Einkommensteuer und der 
Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer im Preussischen Staate", Zeitschrift des königlich statistischen preußischen Bureaus, 8, pp. 25-
84, here p. 32. 
29  The Prussian business censuses of the nineteenth century did not give details on grain or cattle traders. 
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the butchery business.  If we control for population and regional variation the average size of 
bakeries and butcheries was about 10 per cent larger in tax cities than in non-tax cities.  
Consequently, there were less bakeries and butcheries in tax cities than in non-tax cities.  
Table 6b: Impact Factors on Density and Size of Grain Mills, Bakeries and Butcheries in 54 
Prussian Cities, 1875  
 Businesses per 1,000 population Employees per businessa 
 Mills Bakeries  Butcheries Mills Bakeries  Butcheries
Tax 1874 (0/1) 0.01 
[0.03] 
 -0.27° 
[0.16] 
-0.00 
 (0.19) 
0.92 
[3.48] 
  0.64** 
(0.23) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
Population (log) -0.10° 
[0.05] 
  -0.16* 
[0.07] 
    -0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.38 
[2.57] 
     0.46*** 
(0.12) 
  -0.00 
(0.08) 
Wages (log) -0.17 
[0.21] 
  -0.70** 
[0.24] 
    -0.99* 
(0.43) 
-25.85 
[16.71] 
     1.01° 
(0.55) 
  0.99** 
(0.36) 
Provincial dummies 
significant at 5%-level 
- 10 4 - 9 6 
West (0/1) -0.06 
[0.04] 
- - 2.08 
[4.10] 
- - 
Constant 1.37* 
[0.63] 
     5.04***
[0.70] 
     3.37***
(0.84) 
30.19 
[32.36] 
-3.79** 
(1.11) 
1.09 
(0.71) 
Average dep. variable 0.11 1.88  1.67 9.31 2.96 2.21 
Observations (cities) 24 54 52 23 54 52 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.78 0.34 0.19 0.64 0.38 
Prob(F) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Notes: OLS.  The Model contains 10 dummies for the 11 Prussian provinces (except for mills: to increase the 
degrees of freedom a simple dummy variable is used which indicates whether the city belongs to the western 
provinces or not).  Standard errors in parentheses [White-corrected if in brackets].  °, *, **, *** significant on 
10, 5, 1, 0.1 per cent level, respectively.  a Owners included. 
Sources: Die definitiven Ergebnisse der Gewerbezählung vom 1. December 1875 im preussischen Staate (Preussische Statistik, 
40.1), vol. 1, Berlin: Verlag des Königlich Statistischen Bureaus 1878, pp. 48, 289-413, and vol. 2 (Preussische 
Statistik, 41) (1880), pp. 462-466, 470-472. 
 
In 1875 there is no evidence that the size or density of butcheries still differed in the two city 
groups.  The coefficients are close to zero and insignificant on conventional levels.  The results 
for the bakeries, however, suggest that concentration still persisted.  If we control for population, 
wages and regional variation, the typical bakery in a (former) tax city occupied on average 0.6 
employees (22 per cent) more than in non-tax cities.  The analysis of the susbsequent business 
censuses shows that this tax-induced effect slowly petered out.  In 1882 and 1895, bakeries in 
former tax cities were still 16 per cent and significantly larger than in former non-tax cities.  In 
1907, the difference amounted to only 6 per cent and was insignificant.  In none of the 
regressions that use these census data is the coefficient of the tax variable significant for the 
density or size of grain mills or butcheries, respectively.30  Hence we can infer that it was 
                                                          
30  The sources for these calculations are for the census of 1882 Die Gewerbebetriebe im preussischen Staate nach der Auf-
nahme vom 5. Juni 1882. Uebersichten der einzelnen Kreise (Preussische Statistik, vol. 83/2), Berlin: Verlag des König-
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especially the market structure of the bakery business that was affected by the tax.  The 
mimimum efficient scale was clearly larger and the magnitude and sign of the density variable 
suggests that there were probably remnants of concentration.  
However, as the industrial organization literature points out, concentration does not 
necessarily imply market power.  And there is ample anecdotal evidence that not only the 
butchers but the bakers alike vividly rejected the tax.31  Hence the concentration was very 
probably not a result of a tax-induced increase of market power.  We thus have to look for 
another argument that is able to reconcile the finding that the bakery business experienced 
overshifting and an increase of the minimum efficient scale in the tax cities, whereas the butchery 
business was not able to shift the tax burden to the consumers and was no longer concentrated in 
the 1870s. 
A more detailed look at the contemporary discussion offers an alternative interpretation.  
When the Netherlands abolished a similar tax in 1866 the bakeries realized sizable cost 
reductions.32  Is it conceivable that tax collection and monitoring caused considerable surplus 
costs in the Prussian bakery business as well?  There is some evidence on the costs.  The milling 
and slaughter tax was extremely expensive to collect.  The state had to sustain the tax line around 
the tax cities.  Thus the costs did not only cover the tax administration, but the maintenance of 
the city walls and gates as well, which had been preserved only for the purpose of collecting the 
milling and slaughter tax.  The ratio of collection costs to gross revenues was on average between 
15 to 20 per cent, which was much higher than for every other Prussian tax.  In small cities, this 
ratio would even increase to 40 per cent.33 
These costs were borne by the state.  For our problem it is more interesting to see whether 
there were tax-induced surplus costs imposed on bakers or butchers.  Controlling the butchers 
did not require a sophisticated procedure, as livestock was difficult to hide.  Every butcher had to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
lichen Statistischen Bureaus 1885, pp. 468-592; Gewerbestatistik des Reichs (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, vol. 
6/1), Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht 1886, pp. I.64-I.109; Gewerbestatistik der Großstädte (Statistik des Deut-
schen Reichs, vol. 6/2), Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht 1886; for the census of 1895 Gewerbe-Statistik der Ver-
waltungsbezirke (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, n.s., vol. 117/1), Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht 1898; and for 
the census of 1907: Gewerbliche Berufsstatistik, Abt. VI: Kleinere Verwaltungsbezirke; Preußen (Berufs- und Betriebszählung 
vom 12. Juni 1907) (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, n.s. vol. 218), Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht 1909. Wage 
data from Schmitz (1888) and Central-Blatt (1892), pp. 717-783, (1897), pp. 421-488, (1905), pp. 399-475. 
31 See, e.g., F. Schemioneck (1863), Die Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer in Berlin, Berlin: Selbstverlag p. 3; Denkschrift über die 
Mahlsteuer und ihre nachtheiligen Folgen für die weniger bemittelten Volksklassen, sowie insbesondere für das Bäckergewerbe. Hrsg. 
v. Vorstande der Bäcker-Corporation in Köln, Cologne: Bachem 1869; and especially Hans Teschemacher (1912), Die 
Einkommensteuer und die Revolution in Preußen. Eine finanzwissenschaftliche und allgemeingeschichtliche Studie über das 
preußische Einkommensteuerprojekt von 1847, Tübingen: Laupp, pp. 26f. 
32  Ludwig Bamberger (1870), Die Aufhebung der indirekten Gemeindeabgaben in Belgien, Holland und Frankreich, 
Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Politik und Kulturgeschichte, 8, pp. 22-54, here pp. 42, 45f. 
33 Cf. Verhandlungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten. Sammlung sämmtlicher Drucksachen des Hauses der Abgeordneten, vol. 225, 
Berlin 1870, pp. 665-671. 
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keep books of his livestock which could be updated by the authorities only.  Livestock that came 
into the city was added to his books, animals slaughtered under guidance of the authorities were 
subtracted.  Any illegal import or slaughtering would have led to a mismatch of actual stock with 
the records in the books.34 
Whereas the quantity and type of livestock was easily controlled, that of grain or flour was 
not.  The controls at the city gates and within the mills were to avoid three illegal practices: 
smuggling grain or flour into the cities, importing high-taxed wheat (flour) declared as low-taxed 
non-wheat grain (flour) and clandestine grain milling.  For these reasons any incoming flour was 
taxed at the city gate, whereas the procedure was much more complicated with grain.  Incoming 
grain was registered and thoroughly checked at the gate.  The importing trader or baker had to 
specify the type of grain, number and weight of sacks, name and residence of the taxpayer, 
planned processing and mill.  The importer would then receive a tax voucher which entitled him 
to have his load weighed.  Only then was he allowed to proceed to the mill, where the milling 
process had to be constantly supervised by an official of the authorities.  The millers were also 
subject to intense monitoring.  Flour was to be stored only in specified rooms the access to 
which was strictly controlled.  Grain traders, millers and bakers criticized most that they had to 
wait days or even weeks to get the grain milled.  Storing it tied capital and risked that the produce 
rotted.  On top of these indirect costs the tax authority forced the millers to pay the official 
supervisors' salaries.35  A contemporary author called these tax-induced surplus costs a "second 
tax", and an anonymous author conjectured as early as 1848 that a repeal of the tax would result 
in a price decrease larger than the tax precisely because of the abolition of institutional 
impediments.36 
Thus we can expect that the tax collection and monitoring process induced an increase of 
costs.  It is clear that marginal costs must have increased due to the handling of the bureaucratic 
procedures and the wastage due to the waiting time.  If, for the moment, we assume that fixed 
costs were unimportant in the bakery business we can visualize the total welfare losses in 
Figure 2. 
                                                          
34  A usually well-informed contemporary source confirms that the butchery business was much less affected by tax-
induced surplus costs than the bakery business, see Deutsche Gemeinde-Zeitung, 11 (1872), p. 26. 
35 Schemonieck (1863), pp. 6, 16.  See also Otto Wolff (1864), "Die Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer", Vierteljahrschrift für 
Volkswirtschaft, Politik und Kulturgeschichte, 2, pp. 168-196, here 196; Max von Heckel (1893), "Schlacht- und 
Mahlsteuer", in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 1st edn., vol. V, Jena: Fischer, pp. 571-576.  
36  David Born (1850), Denkschrift über den Einfluß der Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer auf die gewerblichen Verhältnisse Berlins, 
besonders in Bezug auf die Arbeitslöhne und auf die Konkurrenzfähigkeit andern Städten gegenüber, Berlin: Buchdruckerei der 
Reform, p. 7 (our translation); Anonymous (1847), Nachtrag über die Nothwendigkeit der Umwandlung der Mahl- und 
Schlachtsteuer [...], Halle: Schwetschke und Sohn, p. 5. 
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Figure 2: The Effect of the Milling Tax on the Price of Flour (no fixed costs) 
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In the common partial analytic framework the introduction of a specific production tax 
causes a shift of the supply curve from S0 to S1 by the tax amount t which produces a welfare loss 
of the triangle L1.  The argument put forward here is that the milling tax imposed considerable 
surplus costs ∆c that increased the supply curve even further, from S1 to S2, inducing a welfare 
loss of triangle L2.   
This is probably not the whole story, as it cannot explain the strong and significant impact 
on the mimimum efficient scale of the bakeries.  Ignoring fixed costs is probably not very 
realistic.  The requirement of an increase of grain storage capacity must have caused additional 
fixed (and/or step-variable) costs which were probably substantial.  Figure 3 visualizes this effect.   
If fixed costs were present, but were not affected by the tax, the tax-induced increase of the 
marginal costs would have had no effect on minimum efficient scale x*; the intersection of the 
marginal cost curve and the average cost curves just moves up vertically (E0 → E1; x0* = x1*).  If, 
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Figure 3: The Effect of the Milling Tax on the Price of Flour (with fixed costs) 
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Figures 2 and 3 also explain the Laspeyres-Paradox.  While Laspeyres believed to measure an 
effect of size p1 – p0 and wondered how this could exceed the tax t, he really observed p2 – p0, 
which, given the low price elasticity of demand for grain and especially rye products, was larger 
than t.  
To summarize, the Prussian milling tax caused unusually large costs. The producers had to 
bear surplus marginal costs and very probably surplus fixed costs which they put on the sales 
price.  The consumers had to pay flour prices that were considerably higher than in non-tax cities 
and the state bore larger collection costs than with any other tax. 
V. Conclusion: The Political Economy of the Milling and Slaughter tax 
This paper has shown that, while the French economist Augustin Cournot is the theoretical 
mastermind of today's literature on tax overshifting, the German economist Etienne Laspeyres 
should be seen as the empirical forebear.  The overshifting of the Prussian milling tax that he 
observed, however, cannot be explained by today's theoretical approaches.  The reason must be 
sought in considerable surplus costs that were induced by the still quite primitive means to 
monitor the tax collection process in nineteenth century Prussian cities.  
One question, however, has so far remained unaddressed.  If the Prussian milling and 
slaughter tax caused high costs to producers, consumers and the state alike, why then was it in 
existence for more than half a century without any major change?   
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The answer lies in the distributional effects of the tax.  The Prussian state levied the 
unpopular milling and slaughter tax, monitored its collection in the cities and had to defend it 
against political attacks.  Since 1848, a third of the revenues were left to the cities.  On top of that 
the cities levied municipal surtaxes.  Hence the Prussian state collected the tax both for his own 
coffers and those of the tax cities.  The cities merely had to pay a small contribution to the state 
for his collection efforts.37  In many cities, the revenues from the milling and slaughter tax 
formed the backbone of their finances. 
Table 7: Milling and Slaughter Tax Revenues as Share of Total Municipal Tax Revenues, 1869 
(per cent) 
Berlin 28 Cologne 31 Magdeburg 48 Spandau  55 
Breslau 32 Königsberg 32 Potsdam 47 Torgau 100 
Source: Ludwig Herrfurth (1878), "Beiträge zur Statistik der Gemeindeabgaben in Preussen. Unter Benutzung amtli-
cher Quellen bearbeitet", Zeitschrift des königlich statistischen preußischen Bureaus, 18, pp. 1-60, here p. 27. 
 
The regressive character of the tax, strikingly demonstrated by the economist Carl Kries who 
compared the tax load of his university professor household with that of a child-rich worker 
household accross the street, was obvious.38  Hence the urban poor contributed considerably to 
the local public revenues.  For the wealthy, the relative burden of the milling and slaughter tax 
was minimal.  There was even tax-induced migration of the rich into the tax cities.  If a rural 
resident was able to convince the tax office that he spent at least six months of the year in a city 
that levied the milling and slaughter tax, he was exempted from the class tax.39  Had the milling 
and slaughter tax been repealed, the cities would have had to find an alternative.  As numerous 
contemporary voices pointed out, this would inevitably have resulted in a direct tax, that is a tax 
that had to be borne by the wealthy much more than the indirect milling and slaughter tax.  
These motives were publicly discussed by contemporary politicians, journalists and academics.40 
                                                          
37 Friedrich G. Schimmelfennig (1840), Die preussischen indirekten Steuern oder die auf Produktion, Fabrikation und 
Konsumtion ruhenden Abgaben im Innern der preussischen Staaten. Eine systematisch geordnete Zusammenstellung der darauf 
Bezug habenden Gesetze und Verordnungen bis zum Schlusse des Jahres 1835, vol. II, Potsdam: Riegel, p. 50; A. Reinick 
(1863/64), "Resultate der Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer in der Periode von 1838 bis mit 1861. Eine finanz-statistische 
Abhandlung", Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus, 3, pp. 217-235, 4, pp. 160-167, here p. 163. 
38  Carl G. Kries (1849), "Über die Mahl- und Schlacht-Steuer, die Einkommen- und Klassen-Steuer in Preußen", 
Archiv der politischen Oekonomie und Polizeiwissenschaft, n.s. 8, pp. 179-224, 277-324, here pp. 189f.. 
39  See on tax-induced migration and tax competition in nineteenth century Germany Mark S. Hallerberg (1996), 
"Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and its Implications for the European Union", World Politics, 48, pp. 
324-357; Mark Spoerer (2002), "Wann begannen Fiskal- und Steuerwettbewerb? Eine Spurensuche in Preußen, 
anderen deutschen Staaten und der Schweiz", Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 2, pp. 11-35, here pp. 44f.; idem 
(forthcoming 2007), "The Political Economy of Taxation in 19th Century Germany", in Alexander Nützenadel 
and Christoph Strupp (eds.), Taxation, State and the Civil Society in Germany and the United States, 1750-1950, 
Wiesbaden: Nomos. 
40 See, e.g., Schemonieck (1863), p. 5; Deutsche Gemeinde-Zeitung, 2 (1863), pp. 269f., 6 (1867), p. 291; Denkschrift 
(1869), pp. 1, 7; Weinhagen (1872), pp. 11-14; Georg von Mayr (1890), "Mahl- und Schlachtsteuer", in Wörterbuch 
des deutschen Verwaltungsrechts, vol. II, Freiburg i.B.: Mohr, pp. 64-68, here p. 65. 
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It is thus not surprising that there was one group that was outspokenly in favour of this tax:  
the urban rich.41  They controlled most city councils as well as the Prussian Lower House and 
voted in 1851 and as late as 1869 successfully against the repeal of the milling and slaughter tax.  
Lobbying for a tax that was annoying for everyone (at the least because of the onerous controls 
at the city gates) and that was regarded as inefficient by many contemporary authors thus made 
nevertheless perfect sense for this group.  Only when after the successful Franco-Prussian war of 
1870-71 and the payment of the French war indemnity the situation of German public finances 
was in an unusually good shape and when public pressure against the milling and slaughter tax 
increased to an unprecedented level did this group give in, and the tax was repealed.   
In essence, lobbying for maintaining the milling and slaughter tax was a result of rent-seeking 
behaviour.  Insofar it was probably the milling and slaughter tax that should have been called 
'class tax' as its incidence fell on the urban poor in a much more pronounced way than even the 
Socialist Ferdinand Lassalle had dared to claim. 
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